law morality and religion in a secular society pdf

Law Morality And Religion In A Secular Society Pdf

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Dimitris Xygalatas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment. A study we conducted, led by psychologist Will Gervais , found widespread and extreme moral prejudice against atheists around the world.

People often assume that moral and religious convictions are functionally the same thing. But are they? Meta-analytic tests of each of these hypotheses yielded weak support for the secularization hypothesis, no support for the equivalence or political asymmetry hypotheses, and the strongest support for the distinct constructs hypothesis.

Law and Religion

People often assume that moral and religious convictions are functionally the same thing. But are they? Meta-analytic tests of each of these hypotheses yielded weak support for the secularization hypothesis, no support for the equivalence or political asymmetry hypotheses, and the strongest support for the distinct constructs hypothesis.

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

Data Availability: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist. Before turning to the specifics of these studies, we first briefly review our conceptualization of moral and religious conviction and review different theoretical positions on the dis connections between religious and moral attitudes and beliefs, as well as some research that has begun to explore the relationship between moral and religious convictions.

People have a variety of perceptions or beliefs about their attitudes. Some attitudes, for example, are perceived or believed to be stronger, more extreme, certain, or important than other attitudes. Debates about abortion, same sex marriage, stem cell research, capital punishment, prayer in public schools, and a host of other issues have constituencies that see these issues in terms of perceptions of right or wrong, in religious terms, or sometimes both [ 4 , 5 , 6 ].

Abortion services and drugs were marketed openly in the U. These practices only started to receive serious public and legal attention when the increasingly professionalized and male medical community started to replace other kinds of health care providers, that is, mostly female midwives and homeopaths [ 7 ]. Abortion is viewed as benignly acceptable as any other form of birth control in a variety of other cultural contexts, such as mainland China [ 8 ], the Czech Republic, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldovia, Romania, and Russia [ 9 ].

The equivalence hypothesis posits that religion provides the motivational source of moral concerns. According to this view, morality and religion are nearly inseparably connected concerns. In a similar vein, past theory and research often discusses the moral and religious basis of certain attitudes as if these are interchangeable constructs [ 18 , 19 ]. Most major religions e. There is also considerable evidence that people believe that a lack of religious belief is associated with immorality; even atheists are more likely to believe that religious non-believers are less moral than religious believers [ 22 ].

These lay beliefs are consistent with psychological explanations or formulations of the role and function of religiosity.

Evolutionary theorists similarly argue that religious and moral beliefs evolved as a set of interconnected cognitive systems that facilitate trust and cooperation within human groups, propositions that suggest that concerns about both are likely to be deeply intertwined [ 24 ]. If the equivalence hypothesis is true, then the degree to which someone sees their position on an issue as a reflection of moral conviction should strongly if not nearly perfectly predict whether they also see their position as a reflection of their religious convictions.

The secularization hypothesis suggests that morality and religion have become increasingly separate overtime, especially in recent years as most societies are becoming increasingly secular. As societies become increasingly secular, public discourse is increasingly demoralized. Technical and legal mechanisms have progressively replaced the role of religion in facilitating cohesion and social control in much of social life [ 25 , 26 , 27 ].

The secularization hypothesis therefore suggests that morality and religion will be tightly associated only for the remaining people who are still religious. The connection between morality and religion, however, is increasingly fragmented for more and more people as religious belief continues to decline in the society at large.

According to the secularization hypothesis, individual differences in religiosity and the degree to which people perceive an attitude as a reflection of religious conviction should interact to predict whether the attitude is also experienced as a moral conviction. Moral conviction and religious conviction should be more strongly correlated for people high, but not low, in religiosity.

Another possibility is that holding policy positions with both moral and religious convictions may be more likely for those on the political right than left. Consistent with this idea, religious Americans are more likely to have conservative than liberal positions on most issues [ 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 ], something that suggests conservatives should be more likely to use their religious beliefs as a foundation for their political beliefs than will liberals.

Although previous research has not found ideological differences in the tendency to have moral convictions about most issues [ 32 ], that does not mean that the factors that lead people to identify a given issue as a moral conviction will be the same for those on the political left and right. People on the political right might be more likely than those on the left to use religious beliefs not only as a cue for what position to take on a given issue, but also as a cue that an attitude is also a moral conviction.

In other words, the political asymmetry hypothesis in its broad form predicts that religious conviction will more strongly predict moral conviction for conservatives than it will for liberals i.

A fourth theoretical perspective suggests that morality and religion are fundamentally different constructs. Kohlberg, for example, posited that religiosity and moral reasoning represented two disconnected areas of social and personal life [ 35 ]. A key distinction between religious and moral beliefs is their comparative degree of authority independence: Religious beliefs are more intimately tied to authorities and rules than are moral beliefs [ 36 , 37 ].

If religious authorities were reverse themselves and proclaim that is okay to eat pork or go hatless, their followers would very likely update their prior beliefs as well. In contrast, people define moral beliefs in more absolutist terms that transcend what institutions or authorities dictate [ 12 , 36 , 37 ].

If, for example, someone has a moral commitment to the idea that eating meat is morally wrong, it would not matter what authorities or the law had to say about the practice: The perceiver would still see meat consumption as wrong. In summary, the distinct constructs hypothesis is that moral convictions operate independently of all concerns about authority, whereas religious convictions are to a very considerable degree authority dependent e.

In contrast to the equivalence hypothesis, the distinct construct hypothesis is that moral and religious convictions should not share a great deal of common variance. We should also note that our hypotheses are not necessarily mutually exclusive. One possibility, for example, is that the secularization and political asymmetry hypotheses could both be true.

That is, we might observe a strong connection between moral and religious convictions about a given issue only among religious conservatives, for example, and not among secular conservatives, in addition to secular and religious liberals. If both the secularization and political asymmetry hypotheses are true, we would predict a three-way interaction between political orientation, religiosity, and religious conviction predicting moral conviction about any given issue, in other words, support for both of these hypotheses is consistent with what we will call the narrower form of the political asymmetry and secularization hypotheses.

Although generally not designed to explicitly test the hypotheses proposed here, there has been some limited study of the connections between moral and religious convictions. Moral convictions about PAS also predicted changes in the perceived legitimacy of the U. People with stronger moral convictions in support of legalizing PAS saw the Supreme Court as higher, and those who were morally opposed to PAS saw the Supreme Court as lower in legitimacy than they did pre-ruling.

Because religiosity and political orientation were not explored as possible moderators of these effects, however, the political asymmetry and the secularization hypotheses can be ruled out by this study. Stronger moral convictions predicted stronger intentions to vote, whereas stronger religious convictions predicted weaker intentions to vote in that election.

Both results were unqualified by party identification, a result at odds with the political asymmetry hypothesis [ 11 ]. The goal of this research was to test these competing hypotheses across a wide range of issues and a variety of different samples.

The University of Illinois at Chicago Institutional Review Board reviewed this research and deemed it exempt, approval — The current research involved returning to every sample we had access to that had at least some of the relevant variables to allow us to test the hypotheses outlined above. We were able to test the secularization and narrow political asymmetry hypotheses, therefore, only with a smaller set of issues and participants. Most of our samples were U. Mechanical Turk workers.

That said, our samples also often included college students recruited from psychology subject pools; students, faculty, and staff recruited from a university listserv; two national samples one true probability sample in the former case, and one quota sample and two community samples of non-U. More specific details about each of our samples is provided in S1 File and all data is available in S1 Datasets.

All studies included a measure of moral conviction, religious conviction, and political orientation. As noted above, only some studies also included a measure of religiosity. More details about the specific measurement for each study is provided in S1 File. Moral conviction associated with attitude objects was measured with between 1 and 4 items.

The religious and moral conviction items were interspersed with other items assessing attitude strength e. We used three items from the Santa Clara Strength of Religiosity scale to measure religiosity [ 39 ]. Religiosity was usually measured at the end of the survey in concert with demographic characteristics, and separately from the attitude items. Participants in most samples were given two items to assess their political orientation see S1 File for exceptions.

We used the following analytic strategy all 19 studies. Participants from each study were included in analyses if they provided data for at least two of the key variables of interest moral conviction, religious conviction, political orientation, and religiosity. Any missing values were replaced with the mean of the sample.

Sample sizes sometimes vary slightly across issues within the same study, however, due to different patterns of missingness for variables included in the analysis, due to some examples of people not completing any measures for a given issue e. We first calculated the bivariate correlations between moral conviction, religious conviction, political orientation, and religiosity for each issue to test the equivalence and distinct construct hypotheses.

To test the political asymmetry hypothesis in the subset of studies that only measured moral conviction, religious conviction, and political orientation, we ran a two-step hierarchical regression model predicting moral conviction. The direct effects of religious conviction mean centered and political orientation midpoint centered were entered in the first block and the interaction of these two predictor variables were entered in the second block.

To test the broad secularization hypothesis as well as the narrow form of secularization and political asymmetry hypotheses in the subset of studies that also measured religiosity, we ran a three-step hierarchical regression model predicting moral conviction. The direct effects of religious conviction mean centered , political orientation midpoint centered , and religiosity mean centered were entered in the first block, all two-way interactions and the three-way interactions of these predictor variables were entered in the second and third block, respectively.

All significant interactions were followed up at one standard deviation above the mean, the mean, and one standard deviation below the mean of religiosity and religious conviction, and one standard deviation above the midpoint, the midpoint, and one standard deviation below the midpoint of political orientation where appropriate see S1 File for all analyses. Hypotheses were then tested using random effects meta analyses using the metafor package in R [ 40 ]. We report the meta-analytic results below.

The equivalence hypothesis predicts that moral and religious convictions are functionally the same constructs, whereas the distinct construct hypothesis predicts that moral and religious convictions are relatively orthogonal.

Statistically, the former hypothesis implies that self-reported moral and religious convictions for any given issue should be highly correlated. Results were more consistent with the distinct constructs than the equivalence hypothesis. Fig 1 summarizes the tests of the equivalence and distinct constructs hypotheses see S1 File for analyses used for inputs into the meta-analysis.

Not one correlation between moral and religious conviction was at or greater than. These results are instead more consistent with the distinct constructs than the equivalence hypothesis.

We interpreted the results as consistent with the broad political asymmetry hypothesis if we observed a two-way interaction between religious conviction and political orientation, such that religious and moral conviction was positively correlated for conservatives, but not or more weakly correlated for liberals. One of these supportive results same-sex marriage also replicated in two different samples Fig 2. For the meta-analysis, the test of this hypothesis was represented by the semi-partial correlation between the religious conviction and political orientation interaction term, and moral conviction controlling for the direct effects of religious conviction and political orientation see S1 File for the hierarchical regressions and follow-ups of any significant interactions.

The secularization hypothesis predicted a two-way interaction between religiosity and religious conviction to predict moral conviction. If the secularization hypothesis is true, then moral and religious conviction should be more strongly correlated for people high than low in religiosity. We found some support for this hypothesis Fig 3. Analyses of simple slopes of significant interactions were also consistent with the pattern predicted by the secularization hypothesis see S1 File.

Although the overall effect size for the religiosity by religious conviction interaction was very small, it also replicated well across 2 out of the 3 tests possible abortion and physician assisted suicide, but not workplace professionalism. We also acknowledged the possibility that the data could support both the political asymmetry and the secularization hypotheses.

In other words, it might be the case that moral and religious conviction are only strongly correlated for religious conservatives. This hypothesis would be supported if we observed a three-way interaction between religiosity, religious conviction, and political orientation predicting moral conviction.

We found no support for the narrower version of the political asymmetry and secularization hypotheses Fig 4. We found only one effect with a confidence interval that did not include zero physician assisted suicide in one sample , a finding that that did not replicate in a second sample.

We found no strong support for the latter and some support for the former hypothesis.

Morality and religion

Hence it is very evident that the law and religion are dependent on each other because before the concept of state or democracy, people were bound to follow the religious duties and can claim religious rights. Thus in this way religion was playing a very vital role of maintaining law and order in ancient societies at different parts of the world. In this seminar paper I am going to deal with the legal history of world i. I am going to discuss how the Hindu Law as a way of living affected the evolution of law and how it lead to the formation of personal laws for every religion in India and who are the people in society governed by Hindu Law. Along with it I will be discussing what are the sources of Hindu Law and how the Hindu Law is still relevant in the modern world by getting support from modern sources of present world. Legal history Legal history or the history of law is the study of how law has evolved and why it changed.

Islam in a Post-Secular Society

How to publish with Brill. Fonts, Scripts and Unicode. Brill MyBook. Ordering from Brill.

Whereas Samuel Moyn has argued that human rights represent the last utopia, sociologist Hans Joas suggests that the modern history of human rights represents a critical alternative to the common theory of secularization understood as disenchantment Weber. Following Durkheim, Joas understands the sacred within the society as the continuous process of refashioning the ideal society within the real society. Mjaaland argues that the normative and formative functions of human rights are better served by a suspicious genealogy of morals, taking also the problematic aspects of human rights policy into account, including its dependence on new forms of violence and cruelty. He concludes that a more modest and pragmatic understanding of human rights may therefore strengthen rather than weaken their authority and future influence.

Aernout J. Comparative law research regarding the relationship between state and religion often uses models. These models normally run from more to less separation between state and religion.

Religion and Morality

People often assume that moral and religious convictions are functionally the same thing. But are they? Meta-analytic tests of each of these hypotheses yielded weak support for the secularization hypothesis, no support for the equivalence or political asymmetry hypotheses, and the strongest support for the distinct constructs hypothesis.

Morality and religion involves the relationship between religious views and morals. Many [ quantify ] religions have value frameworks regarding personal behavior meant to guide adherents in determining between right and wrong. Many religious systems share tenets with secular value-frameworks such as consequentialism , freethought , and utilitarianism.

Secular Formatting of the Sacred

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Thanks to Sir Robert Hinde, Dr. Oliver Curry, and three anonymous reviewers for commenting on earlier drafts of this article. Special thanks to Professor Maureen Callanan for valuable advice and assistance. The relationship between religion and morality has long been hotly debated. Does religion make us more moral? Is it necessary for morality?

The relation between law, morality, and religion in the West has grown progressively more complex and fragmented over the last five hundred years.

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Нареченный Детским манежем, Третий узел ничем не напоминал стерильную атмосферу остальной части шифровалки. Его обстановка напоминала домашнюю - мягкий ковер, высокотехнологичная звуковая система, холодильник, полный напитков и всяческой еды, маленькая кухня и даже баскетбольное кольцо. В отношении шифровалки в АНБ сложилась своеобразная философия. Нет смысла вбухивать миллиарды долларов в дешифровальный компьютер и одновременно экономить на тех, кто работает на этой превосходной технике.

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